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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: Effect of Agreement of Parties
Relieving Adoptive Father of Support of Children
In Bingham v. Bingham, 52 Okla. B.J. 1102 (1981), the court of ap-
peals upheld the modification of a divorce decree, initiating child support for
two minor adopted children. In the original divorce decree, the district court
incorporated a private agreement between the parents and gave custody to
the mother while the father "is excused from the payment of child support..
. and ...is without visitation rights to said minor children."' When the
mother requested modification of the decree ten months later, the court
found a "change of conditions" sufficient to order the father to begin paying
support.
In finding the private "contract" voidable as against public policy, and
its incorporation in the decree unenforceable, the appellate court noted that
the district court's acceptance of it had the practical effect of (1) terminating
the parental rights of the father, without strict conformance to statutory re-
quirements of notice and hearing, and absent the presentation of evidence
resulting in a finding by the court that termination was in the best interests of
the children; 2 and (2) directly violating the statutory duty of the court to pro-
vide the minor children with the financial and parental support to which they
are entitled, a duty that cannot be set aside by agreement of the parties.
The court emphasized that the state's overwhelming interest in protect-
ing and providing for children is reflected in the strict statutory requirements
regulating the creation of parental responsibility through adoption,' and such
a decree relegates adoption to a second-class parental relationship.
While recognizing the statutory standard of proof of change of cir-
cumstances for modification of the amount of child support in a divorce
decree, the court held, in this limited circumstance, that where no support is
provided in the divorce decree this constitutes error on the part of the trial
court, 4 and no change of circumstance need be shown to invoke the father's
statutory obligation to support his children, whether natural or adopted.5
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: Retroactive Modification of Divorce
Decree
In McNeal v. Robinson,' a father appealed a contempt citation and
judgment for arrearages. He had failed to pay child support for the time the
Bingham v. Bingham, 52 OKLA. B.J. 1102, 1102 (1981) (emphasis by the court).
' 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1130 (Supp. 1980).
10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 60.1 -60.23 (Supp. 1980).
12 OKLA. STAT. § 1277 (Supp. 1980).
10 OKLA. STAT. § 4 (Supp. 1980).
52 OKLA B.J. 1023 (May 2, 1981).
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children were in his care. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that a
divorce decree may not be modified without the court's consent,2 reversed
the trial court on the issue of arrearages, and affirmed the contempt citation.
Retroactive modification allows the parties to a divorce decree to
modify the decree without court approval. The court in McNeal, while main-
taining that Oklahoma does not permit all such modifications,3 found that it
needed a more flexible rule. Parents obligated to pay child support will not,
as a matter of law, automatically receive credit for expenditures not in com-
pliance with the divorce decree. Credit may be allowed, however, when the
parent who is obligated to pay keeps the children in his care, with the consent
of the custodial parent.
Should the custodial parent continue to incur expenses of child
maintenance for continuing custody of the children, then the obligor-parent
would be liable to the custodial parent for such expenses, but not to exceed
the amount of child support set out in the original divorce decree. The court
will decide on a case-by-case basis whether credit will be allowed.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: Gender Requirements for
Labor and Delivery Room Nurses
In Backus v. Baptist Medical Center,' a federal district court held that a
hospital did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 by requiring
labor and delivery nurses to be female and refusing to hire a male nurse for a
duty position in the obstetrical and gynecology ward. The Court ruled that
the gender requirement was a bona fide occupational qualification' justified
by the unreasonable intrusion into the privacy of patients that would be caused
by allowing unselected male nurses continued intimate contact with female
patients.
The plaintiff graduated from nursing school in 1978 and immediately
sought employment as a fulltime registered nurse in the obstetrical and
gynecology department. The hospital denied him employment, explaining
that it did not employ male nurses in that ward because of "the concerns of
[its] female patients for privacy and personal dignity which makes it impossi-
ble for a male employee to perform the duties of the position effectively.""
The district court first held that the hospital had standing to raise the
constitutional right of privacy, finding that patient dissatisfaction resulting in
2 Craig v. Collins, 285 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1955).
52 OKLA. B.J. 1023 (May 2, 1981).
510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964).
3 42 §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) permits sexual differentiation in certain activities if sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise."




economic loss to the hospital gave it a personal stake in the matter5 and that
the doctor-patient, hospital-patient relationship permitted the hospital to
raise the issue on behalf of its patients.
6
Reaching the constitutional issue, the court recognized that medical
care of the human body involved important privacy rights protected by the
Constitution.' It found that an exclusion of males in this particular job was
justified by the right of the hospital to protect female patients from un-
wanted invasion of privacy by an "unselected" male nurse.' The court focus-
ed on the "deep seated feeling of personal privacy involving one's own
genital area,"' and the widely held belief that "[hiaving one's body inspected
by members of the opposite sex may invade that individual's most fundamen-
tal privacy right, the right of privacy of one's own body."" Thus, the court
stated, "[iln this area of the law, the courts focus not on the employee's
competence, but rather on the obvious bodily intrusion which will result.""
It rejected any analogy between a male nurse and a male obstetri-
cian/gynecologist by finding significant the fact that the doctor is selected
while the nurse is not. The court drew further support from the multitude of
cases dealing with an inmate's constitutional right to privacy. These cases
hold that a correctional employer may exclude a member of one sex from a
job where there will be continued contact with prisoners while they are
engaged in sensitive acts.'I
JUDGMENTS: Effect of a Modification of the Original Judgment
on the Dormant Judgment Statute
In Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 52 Okla. B.J. 1614 (July 4,
1981), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where a modification of an
original judgment is a mere clerical correction, the modification does not af-
fect the running of the dormancy statute.'
The issue arose out of a monetary judgment received by Chandler-
Frates against Kostich. The judgment was awarded to Chandler-Frates on
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
6 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1964).
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-SEX § 14.30 (3d ed. 1980).
" City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97 (Pa.
1973).
510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
" See Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The dormancy statute is 12 OKLA. STAT. § 735 (1971). The statute provides that a
judgment is effective for five years, and unless the judgment is executed upon during the five
years, the law will treat the judgment as being satisfied. See Ashur v. McCreey, 150 Okla. 111,
300 P. 767 (1931).
1981]
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January 5, 1972, for a set aiirount with 10 percent prejudgment interest from
August 1, 1968. In August, 1976, the trial court, upon the request of the ap-
pellant, Kostich, modified the order by setting the prejudgment interest at 6
percent, the rate specified by statute.'
The appellee, Chandler-Frates, on February 16, 1977, sought to execute
upon the judgment. The appellant filed a motion to quash and plea to
jurisdiction, asserting that the five-year limitation of the dormancy statute
precluded execution. The appellee responded that because the original judg-
ment had been modified the relevant date for computing the dormancy
statute was the date of the modification instead of the date of the original
judgment. The trial court denied appellant's motion.
The supreme court indicated that the determinative issue as to what is
the relevant date in computing the dormancy statute was whether the
modification of the judgment was a vacation of a void judgment and entry of
a new judgment or merely a correction of the original journal entry. If the
modification is a new judgment, the dormancy statute runs from the date of
the new judgment, but if the modification is only a correction of the journal
entry, the original judgment is still valid and the dormancy statute runs from
the date of the original judgment.
The court found that the modification was only a correction of the
journal entry because although the trial court had jurisdiction to award pre-
judgment interest, it lacked authority to award more than the statutory rate
of 6 percent specified by statute. Because the rate of interest is a matter of
law, the trial court did not have to set out the interest rate in the order.
Therefore, the original judgment was still valid and the date of that original
judgment would be used in computing the running of the dormancy statute.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: Effect of Prior Settlement By Less
Than All Defendants
In a case of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
settlement by fewer than all the defendants in a suit does not preclude the
other non-settling defendants from bringing an action for malicious prosecu-
tion. In Young v. First State Bank, 52 Okla. B.J. 1089 (May 5, 1981), the
plaintiff in the malicious prosecution suit, Young, alleged that the defendant
Bank had previously filed a suit unjustifiably naming him as one of three
defendants in a suit to recover on three notes and to foreclose a real estate
mortgage. The defendant Bank alleged that the suit was barred because it
had dismissed the suit with prejudice against all three defendants as a result
of settlement with the other two defendants. The Bank also argued that the
dismissal was tantamount to an admission by the defendants that probable




cause had existed to bring the original suit in that the defendants procured
the settlement by the payment of money.
The court agreed that where there was one single defendant, or where
all defendants took part in the settlement process, the settlement would bar a
suit for malicious prosecution.' However, in this case, because plaintiff
Young had not taken part in or consented to the settlement, it cannot be said
that he made an admission as to probable cause. The mere fact that one
defendant admits that he owes money to the plaintiff by making a settlement
in no way establishes that the other defendants were not wrongfully sued.
PARENT AND CHILD: Appointed Counsel Not Required for
Termination of Parental Rights
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,' the United States
Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the due process clause does not
require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in every hearing
for termination of parental rights.
In Lassiter, the petitioner's minor child was adjudicated neglected
because of inadequate medical care, and ,custody was given to the Depart-
ment of Social Services in 1975. The following year, Lassiter was convicted
of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five to forty years in
prison. In 1978 the Department of Social Services petitioned the court to ter-
minate the mother's parental rights because she had had no contact with the
child in almost three years and had made no progress toward correcting the
conditions that led to the child's removal from her custody. No counsel was
appointed for Lassiter, an indigent, at the termination hearing in which the
court found that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the
child. The appellate court upheld this decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's four-
teenth amendment claim. The Court emphasized that due process requires
the appointment of counsel for an indigent only when the litigant may lose
his physical liberty if the litigation is lost, whether the proceedings are civil or
criminal2 and even where a prison term may be brief.3 As a litigant's interest
in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel.
4
The Court balanced the private parental right to and desire for "the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children," ' the
Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 114 P.2d 335 (1941).
49 U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 2, 1981).
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1978) (involuntary transfer to a mental hospital); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile hearing result might be commitment to an institution); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
' Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (in probation revocation hearing, the deci-
sion whether counsel should be appointed is made on case-by-case basis).
I Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
1981]
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state's interest in the welfare of the child, as well as in saving judicial time
and money, and the risk that the termination procedures used will lead to
erroneously depriving an uncounseled parent of his child. Holding that the
trial court should make the decision whether due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent parent on a case-by-case basis, the
Court recognized, with approval, that higher standards than those minimally
tolerable under the Constitution have been adopted in many states.
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court held that the trial court did
not err in failing to appoint counsel for Lassiter because (1) there were no
allegations of neglect or abuse in the petition on which criminal charges
could be based; (2) while the Department of Social Services was represented
by counsel, there was no expert testimony; (3) there were no troublesome
points of law; (4) the weight of the evidence was sufficiently great that lack
of counsel could not have made a determinative difference; (5) the absence of
counsel did riot render the proceedings fundamentally unfair; and (6) Lassiter
had expressly declined to appear at the 1975 hearing on the neglect petition.
PROCEDURE: Rendering of the Judgment
In McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 Okla. B.J. 847 (April 11,
1981), the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of when a judgment
is in fact rendered. McCullough involved the plaintiff's appeal from a mo-
tion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The defendant's mo-
tion was filed November 13, 1978, and was granted on February 20, 1979.
The trial court ruled solely on the briefs, outside the presence of the parties,
and the only record of the ruling was a minute entry and a corresponding
entry on the appearance docket. There was no record that any timely notice
had been sent to the parties involved in the case. Counsel for both sides were
without notice of the ruling until they received the trial judge's letter of April
13, 1979. The plaintiff brought his appeal to the supreme court on May 10,
1979, but it was dismissed because the appeal had not been filed within thirty
days after the decision of the trial court.' The April 7, 1981, ruling was after
rehearing of the motion of dismissal.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when a judge rules on a mat-
ter, it cannot be effected by a minute entry nor by an entry on the appear-
ance docket, when those are made out of the presence of the parties. Until a
timely notice of the decision has been mailed to the parties who are appearing
in the action, no ruling or judgment can be said to have been rendered. The
court said that because the plaintiff did not know of the ruling until he
received the April 13, 1979, letter, the appeal filed with the court on May 10,
1979, "was brought within thirty days of April 13th."
1 12 OKLA. STAT. § 990 (1971): "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced
from an appealable disposition . . . within thirty (30) days from the date of the final order on
judgment sought to be reviewed."
416 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/13
1981] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 417
Justice Simms, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with
the result of rehearing but disagreed with the court's reasoning. Justice
Simms argued that the mere entry of the judgment was nothing more than a
"ministerial act" and not a "rendition of judgment." He stated that the
ministerial act of entry of the decision does not begin the time for the com-
mencement of an appeal but is calculated from the day it is rendered, i.e.,
when the terms of the decision are pronounced by the judge.2
Judgment on a matter, when the parties to the action are in absentia
and it is made on a day not set aside for pronouncement of the decision, can-
not be considered rendered until the parties to the action are notified of the
decision. This decision represents a departure from prior Oklahoma cases,
which have held a judgment to be final between the parties when it is
rendered, regardless of whether it is entered.3
2 12 OKLA. STAT. app. 2, Rule 1.11(b) (1971): The statute provides: "If judgment on
jury verdict is reserved or if the case is tried to the court, judgment is deemed rendered when its
terms are completely pronounced by the judge and clearly resolve all the issues in controversy."
Adamson v. Brady, 182 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1947).
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